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With the approach of the 1980s, the National Bureau of Economic
Research identified the issue of capital formation as a primary target for
empirical economic research. Several considerations made this choice a
sensible one. Economic thinking has nearly always emphasized the cen-
tral role of fixed capital in the physical production process. In addition,
the evolution of public policy discussion in the United States during the
1970s had made clear that economists and business leaders were not
alone in calling for an increased rate of capital formation. What may once
have been an esoteric subject had emerged as a widely supported national
objective. Finally—and most importantly, from the National Bureau's
perspective—the nature of many of the important questions involved in
the capital formation issue suggested the potential ability of serious
empirical economic research to increase basic understanding.
Within the National Bureau's overall research effort, questions about
capital formation also seemed to represent a natural direction for the
Financial Markets and Monetary Economics program. In an advanced
economy like that of the United States, with highly developed financial
markets, capital formation represents not just the allocation of physical
resources but the allocation of financial resources as well. Every physical
investment decision has its financial counterpart. Moreover, a large body
of evidence indicates that these financial allocations do not simply mirror
corresponding physical allocations that would take place in any case. The
financial and the physical aspects of businesses' and individuals' decisions
in this area are fully interdependent, so that the surrounding financial
environment importantly affects both the amount and the composition of
the capital formation that the economy as a whole undertakes.
Indeed, financial influences on capital formation in the American
economy are so many and so pervasive that some more specific focus wasBenjamin M. Friedman
necessary for even a major research project. In this context the respective
roles of debt and equity in financing capital formation stood out as being
of particular interest, at least in part because these roles not only appear
to have been undergoing some change but also seem likely to evolve
further in the future. Hence the choice of specific subject: The Changing
Roles of Debt and Equity in Financing U.S. Capital Formation.
The starting point for this research effort was a pair of broad questions
about the markets in which the debt and equity securities of business
corporations undertaking physical capital formation are issued, traded,
and priced. First, how have the markets priced corporate debt and equity
securities in the past, and what aspects of the markets' functioning have
accounted for these evaluations? Second, how have corporations' financ-
ing patterns responded in this environment, and what specific aspects of
the interaction between the market mechanism and corporate financing
decisions have accounted for these responses? Fourteen papers address-
ing these questions, written by eighteen National Bureau researchers,
constituted the first major stage of the project.
The papers in this volume are the authors' summaries of six of these
fourteen papers. These six papers were prepared for a conference that
the National Bureau sponsored at Williamsburg, Va. on 2-3 April 1981.
The conference provided an opportunity to report on this research to,
and receive valuable feedback from, an audience consisting of financial
market practitioners representing investment management firms, insur-
ance companies, commercial banks, and investment banking firms, as
well as financial officers of corporations in nonfinancial lines of business.
The six papers presented at that conference, and published here for the
first time, provide a balanced overview of the first major stage of this
research project, which is now complete.
How Have the Markets Priced Corporate Debt and Equity Securities?
The majority of the papers prepared during the first stage of the
research project adopted a market perspective. Two of these papers
examined the historical experience directly. Three focused on the core
of the market mechanism consisting of the relationships connecting ex-
pectations, risk, and market prices. Four additional papers addressed
specific questions including inflation risk, the interaction between infla-
tion and market regulation, effects of federal debt management policy,
and the increasing internationalization of the U.S. financial markets.
Patric H. Hendershott, in his paper "Inflation, Resource Utilization,
and Debt and Equity Returns," reviewed the basic pricing experience in
the U.S. debt and equity markets during the past half-century. More
specifically, Hendershott investigated the relationships among Treasury
bill rates, the realized returns on Treasury bonds and bills, and theIntroduction
realized returns on equities and corporate bonds, in the context of
variations in price inflation as well as the business cycle. His analysis
therefore provided a background for considering the fundamental port-
folio decision concerning the broad division of investable funds among
equities, long-term debt, and short-term debt.
Hendershott's analysis documented three separate findings. First, the
experience of real and nominal returns on Treasury bills since the 1951
Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord has differed sharply from the corre-
sponding pre-Accord patterns. In earlier years nominal bill yields were
reasonably stable and real yields extremely volatile, while more recently
the nominal bill rate has cycled around a rising trend and real rates have
stayed near zero. Second, unanticipated changes in bond coupon yields
have dominated the relative return relationship between bonds and
Treasury bills. Because bond coupon rates have risen with (unexpected)
inflation during the past fifteen years, bonds have earned negative real
returns. Third, the relative return relationship between bonds and
equities has varied systematically over the business cycle, with equities
earning large positive relative returns around business cycle troughs and
large negative relative returns around peaks.
Hendershott's paper, which appears as Chapter 1 of this volume, is an
introduction to a more comprehensive study which will be part of the
second stage of this overall research project.
William C. Brainard, John B. Shoven, and Lawrence Weiss, in their
paper "The Financial Valuation of the Return to Capital" (Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity No. 2, 1980), also examined the market's
valuation of equities and other claims to corporate capital. They used
cross-section data on the valuation of a sample of U.S. firms at different
times to estimate the time-discount and risk-adjustment factors necessary
to explain the observed market values for these firms during the twenty
years 1958-77. Cross-sectional variation in the relevant measures of the
riskiness of earnings streams having the same time profile of expected
returns provided the means by which they could distinguish separate
time-discount and risk-adjustment factors.
The method used by Brainard, et al., to calculate the present dis-
counted value of future cash flows for each firm in each year involved first
calculating the age structure, replacement value, and rate of return of the
firm's capital stock. They then computed aggregate series of gross and net
returns. Finally, to explore the sensitivity of their results to variations in
assumptions about expectation formation, they used ten different
methods of forecasting future earnings.
The results of this analysis confirmed a large decline in market values
relative to the present values of after-tax cash flows, discounted by either
a constant real rate or an inflation-adjusted bond rate. Specifically, the
real discount rate required to equate market and present discountedBenjamin M. Friedman
values increased from less than five percent in the late 1960s to more than
ten percent on average in the late 1970s. Moreover, these results did not
depend on a particular, perhaps overly optimistic, assumption about
expected future earnings. The sharp decline in firms' market values
relative to present values of the corresponding streams emerged even
with the most pessimistic of the ten earnings expectations models, which
assumed a continuation of the historically low rates of return experienced
in the latter part of the sample period.
Brainard, et al., also briefly considered four familiar factors sometimes
hypothesized to account for this decline in valuation: increased investor
aversion to risk; an increased tax burden on corporate earnings due to
price inflation; investors' inability to assess earnings streams correctly
because of inflation; and an overall decrease in expected rates of return
due to higher energy prices and/or increased government regulation. The
results along these lines were mixed at best. In the end the authors
concluded that the combination of measurable characteristics of firms
and conventional methods of projecting and discounting future earnings
is not likely to explain the decline in market values that dominated the
1970s.
Robert C. Merton, in his paper "On Estimating the Expected Return
on the Market: An Exploratory Investigation" (Journal of Financial
Economics, December 1980), examined a series of issues relating to the
measurement of expected returns assessed against their riskiness in the
equity market. The expected return on "the market" is a concept often
central to problems in both portfolio management and corporate finance.
For example, to implement even the most passive investment strategy, an
investor must have some idea of the expected return on the market in
order to determine how much of his portfolio to allocate to a fully
diversified mix of equity holdings. Similarly, the expected equity return is
an important element in determining "hurdle rates" for capital budget-
ing, or the allowed "fair" rate of return in regulated industries.
The conventional way to estimate this expected return, at least for
purposes of economic research, is to adjust the prevailing return on some
"safe" alternative to equities—say, a short-term interest rate—according
to the historical average difference by which equity returns have ex-
ceeded this alternative. This procedure does, of course, explicitly reflect
the dependence of the expected equity return on prevailing interest rates.
By contrast, it does not take into account the effect of changes in the level
of risk associated with equities, or changes in investors' attitudes toward
that risk. It is clear that the dependence of expected return on risk in this
context could matter in principle. Merton's object was to evaluate
whether in fact it matters importantly in practice.
Merton addressed this question by analyzing the implications of three
models of securities pricing that explicitly reflect the dependence of theIntroduction
expected equity return on changing risk. In each case he derived a set of
procedures for estimating the expected return on the market that in-
corporated the underlying pricing model, as well as the constraint that, as
a consequence of risk aversion, the expected return on the market must
exceed the return on riskless assets. Merton then estimated each of these
three models using U.S. data for 1926-78.
The chief conclusion from this analysis was that the presence or ab-
sence of risk dependence, and its specific form if present, are both
quantitatively important for the estimation of the expected market re-
turn. In other words, because the average variability of the realized
market return changes significantly over time, it is important to allow for
changes in the variability associated with expected market returns when
predicting the expected return in the market in excess of "safe" alterna-
tives.
Robert J. Shiller, in his paper "Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to Be
Justified by Subsequent Changes in Dividends?" {American Economic
Review, June 1981) examined from a different perspective the same
question of the variability of equity prices and returns. The particular
focus of Shiller's investigation was the combination of the "dividend
discount" relationship between equity prices and expected future div-
idends and the "efficient markets" principle that investors exploit all
available information in anticipating the future. More specifically, the
dividend discount model, stated in inflation-adjusted terms, asserts that
real equity prices equal the real values of expected future real dividends
discounted by the appropriate real interest rate; a particular version of
this model, which has found substantial acceptance in practice, further
assumes that the relevant real interest rate is constant or nearly so. The
efficient markets principle in turn asserts that equity prices at any time
already incorporate all available information about the future of div-
idends, so that changes in dividend expectations (and hence in equity
prices) reflect only new information as it emerges.
Shiller's goal was to test the familiar objection that observed equity
prices are too volatile to be consistent with a pricing mechanism based on
the dividend discount model combined with the efficient markets princi-
ple. The point of this objection is simply that observed movements in real
equity prices are too large, in comparison with the subsequently experi-
enced movements in real dividends, to be realistically attributed to any
objective flow of new information about those dividends. Hence either
the dividend discount model or the efficient markets principle (or both)
must be inadequate as a characterization of how the market works.
Shiller found that tests based on data for the Standard and Poor's
Composite Stock Price Index since 1870, and for the Dow Jones Indus-
trial Average since 1928, bear out this objection. More specifically, after
adjustments for price inflation and a time trend, the observed movementsBenjamin M. Friedman
in equity prices could have been justified as the rational response to new
information about expected future dividend movements only if the latter
were many times bigger than those actually observed. Alternatively,
variation in the (unobserved) real interest rate could have reconciled the
observed movements in equity prices and rationally expected future
dividend movements only if that variation had been implausibly large. On
the basis of these results, Shiller concluded that the combination of the
dividend discount model and the efficient markets principle does not
provide an adequate description of the equity market's pricing
mechanism.
John G. Cragg and Burton G. Malkiel, in their paper "Expectations
and the Valuation of Shares" (forthcoming as part of a National Bureau
monograph bearing the same title), used data collected from a survey of
financial analysts to explore the equity market pricing mechanism. Dur-
ing the 1960s Cragg and Malkiel had obtained estimates of the short- and
long-run changes in individual company earnings, together with related
financial information, from seventeen major investment firms. Their
research had two main objectives: to characterize the surveyed expecta-
tions in relation to familiar theories of expectations like those encom-
passed in the efficient markets principle; and to examine the role of these
expectations in the determination of the prices of individual companies'
equities.
On the first question, Cragg and Malkiel found that the surveyed
expectations failed in a number of ways to conform to the assumptions
often made in efficient markets models. On the second question, how-
ever, they found that the surveyed expectations did seem to have affected
equity prices, both in ways suggested by the familiar theory and in
apparently other ways too. In particular, despite the familiar theoretical
principle that the market takes account of only systematic (that is, mar-
ket-related) risk in pricing a security, Cragg and Malkiel found, first, that
a variety of systematic factors appear to affect security prices and,
second, that specific (that is, market-independent) risk may also affect
the price of a company's equities.
Malkiel's paper "Risk and Return: A New Look," which appears as
Chapter 2 of this volume, summarizes and extends this work.
Zvi Bodie, in his paper "Innovation for Stable Real Retirement In-
come" (Journal of Portfolio Management, Fall 1980), addressed the
problems that price inflation causes for all savers including in particular
those saving for their retirement. Bodie showed that conventional U.S.
debt and equity financial instruments—including short-term money mar-
ket instruments, long-term bonds, and equities—have all failed to pro-
vide holders with an adequate hedge against inflation during the past
twenty-five years. On average, money market instruments have borne a
small positive after-inflation return and equities a larger return, whileIntroduction
bonds have borne a negative after-inflation return. The returns on all
three kinds of instruments have been highly volatile, however, both
before and after inflation.
Bodie focused on finding the most appropriate asset base in the U.S.
capital markets for funding price-indexed retirement savings plans. He
found that, during the past twenty-five years, the investment strategy
offering the least risky after-inflation rate of return would have been to
hold money market instruments together with a small position in a
well-diversified portfolio of commodity futures contracts. The after-
inflation return that such a portfolio would have earned, however, is
approximately zero. In more recent work, also done within this overall
research project, Bodie has extended this analysis by considering the
tradeoff between risk and return facing an investor in the U.S. capital
markets who is concerned about after-inflation returns but is not solely
interested in minimizing risk. Money market instruments are once again
the cornerstone of any low-risk investment strategy, and equities are the
main ingredient in any high-return portfolio. Commodity futures con-
tracts are the only asset whose after-inflation return is positively corre-
lated with inflation. Adding them to a portfolio therefore lowers the risk
associated with any target after-inflation rate of return.
Bodie's paper "Investment Strategy in an Inflationary Environment,"
which appears as Chapter 3 of this volume, summarizes and extends this
work.
Edward J. Kane, in his paper "Accelerating Inflation and the Distribu-
tion of Household Savings Incentives" (in Stagflation: The Causes,
Effects, and Solutions, U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, De-
cember 1980), used cross-section data to show how U.S. households in
different economic and demographic classes have reallocated their sav-
ings in response to the combination of accelerating inflation and reg-
ulated deposit interest rates. On balance, these forces have led house-
holds of below-average wealth to shift their savings into tangible assets,
especially real estate, and households of above-average wealth to shift
their savings into unregulated financial assets. Both responses have in-
creased the riskiness of savers' portfolios.
Kane's analysis showed how, both to hedge inflation risk on their
nondiscretionary contractual savings and to eke out a positive net after-
tax real return on their discretionary savings, all but the wealthiest U.S.
households have found it advantageous to substitute investments in hous-
ing and other real estate, as well as consumer durables and collectibles, in
place of traditional saving vehicles like deposit accounts and savings
bonds. By contrast, as a result of differential taxes and transactions costs,
the nation's wealthiest households have moved on balance out of both
traditional deposit accounts and home equity into certificates of deposit,
marketable bonds, and equity in investment real estate. Given these new8 Benjamin M. Friedman
riskier portfolios, less wealthy households have actually fared better than
have wealthy households. Real returns earned by wealthy households
have been poor, as bond prices have fallen and equity values have failed
to keep pace with inflation, while trends in the relative price of housing
have rewarded those who shifted heavily into real estate, especially on a
highly leveraged basis.
Kane's analysis also revealed several other important trends, including
a greatly increased emphasis on leveraged housing investment among
young households and an increased concentration of marketable bonds
and equities among wealthy households. Households headed by persons
under age twenty-five have greatly expanded their equity in houses,
although still not enough to lift the overall return on their savings up to
the level achieved by older groups. The tendency to buy smaller homes,
due to smaller family size as well as restricted financing opportunities, has
held down young households' ability to earn comparable rates of return.
The increasingly tight concentration of marketable securities in the hands
of wealthy investors suggests that only they could economically engage in
strictly financial-market disintermediation. It also explains regulators'
strategy of relaxing deposit interest ceilings only on minimum-deposit
(and longer-maturity) accounts.
These findings served to underscore the unintended consequences of
the combination of accelerating inflation and deposit interest ceilings.
The ultimate economic effects have been to distort the sectoral composi-
tion of saving and risk-bearing in ways likely to crowd out productive
business investment, as well as to distort the distributions of income and
opportunity.
V. Vance Roley, in his paper "The Effect of Federal Debt Management
Policy on Corporate Bond and Equity Yields" (Quarterly Journal of
Economics, in press), addressed the effect on U.S. debt and equity yields
associated not with the government's overall deficit total but with its
manner of financing that deficit. In theory, federal debt management
policy may play an important role in determining the yield structure of
both government and private securities. Previous empirical studies,
however, have typically failed to detect quantitatively significant effects
of federal debt management. By contrast, using a disaggregated struc-
tural model of the markets for government and private securities, Roley
found that such effects were important.
The maturity composition of the federal debt has exhibited dramatic
changes during the past thirty years. In 1950 the average maturity of the
U.S. Treasury's outstanding debt held by private investors was 124
months. The average maturity fell steadily to 58 months in 1960, as the
Treasury shifted to a greater reliance on short-term securities. Despite
the "Operation Twist" policy of the early 1960s, the average maturity in
fact remained stable during 1960-66, but thereafter it declined further toIntroduction
a low of 29 months in 1975, in large part because of the 4.25 percent
interest ceiling on new Treasury bond issues. Beginning in 1975 the
Treasury embarked on a policy to lengthen the federal debt, and as a
result the average maturity rose to 46 months in 1980.
The impact of debt management policy on corporate debt and equity
returns depends in the first instance on the degree of substitutability
among government securities of different maturity, and on the substitut-
ability between government securities and private securities, within in-
vestors' portfolios. It also depends on the responses of private debt and
equity issuers. In one extreme, for example, the ultimate impact of a
federal debt management operation could be an unchanged structure of
yields together with a significant shift in the composition of corporate
financing.
Roley's empirical results indicated that changes in the maturity com-
position of the federal debt significantly affect the markets for govern-
ment and private securities, at least in the short run. In particular, the
corporate bond yield closely follows the long-term government bond
yield, while the equity yield shows smaller movements in the same
direction. In the longer run the effects on yields are smaller than the
initial impacts, even when the debt composition changes are permanent.
In general, the results indicated that lengthening the federal debt reduces
incentives for both bond and equity finance by the corporate sector, and
vice versa.
David G. Hartman, in his paper "International Effects on the U.S.
Capital Market" (NBER Working Paper No. 581), examined changes in
the U.S. debt and equity markets due to the tendency toward greater
economic interdependence. Hartman's principal finding was that the
increasingly larger international capital flows have exerted significant
effects on U.S. corporate bond rates. Moreover, since the corporate
bond rate and other interest rates closely tied to it are often important
determinants of physical investment decisions, this result suggests that
international financial capital transactions also affect the U.S. rate of
physical capital formation.
Hartman began by documenting the changing nature and magnitude of
international transactions in the U.S. capital market. Although not long
ago such transactions were small in comparison with the size of the U.S.
market, in recent years foreign participation in the U.S. markets for both
debt and equity securities has expanded greatly. Foreign investors are
now major purchasers of both bonds and equities issued in the United
States, and foreign borrowers now account for a significant fraction of all
bonds issued in the United States. To date, foreign equity issues have
been more limited.
Hartman then developed a model of the determination of the U.S.
corporate bond rate that, in contrast to most interest rate models, admit-10 Benjamin M. Friedman
ted the possibility of international influences. Empirical evidence indi-
cated that such influences are both significant and sizable.
How Has Corporate Financing Responded?
The remaining papers prepared during the first stage of the project
shifted to the corporate perspective, focusing on the responses of cor-
porations' financing to these market influences and on specific factors
conditioning that response. One paper, which developed new historical
data series from primary sources, examined the corporate financing and
corporate balance sheet experience directly. Two papers addressed con-
siderations associated with taxation in determining corporate financing
decisions, one in the context of the differential tax treatment of dividends
and capital gains, and one in the context of the risk of corporate bank-
ruptcy. Two further papers addressed the rapid development of private
pensions and the growth of the public debt through government deficits
as specific external factors affecting corporate financing decisions, and
highlighted the implications of these developments for U.S. capital
formation.
John H. Ciccolo, Jr., in his paper "Changing Balance Sheet Rela-
tionships in the U.S. Manufacturing Sector, 1926-77," documented
trends in the sources and uses of funds, market valuations, and rates of
return for U.S. manufacturing firms during the half-century ending in
1977. The chief objective of Ciccolo's work was to derive economic
balance sheet relationships based on market valuations of firms' secur-
ities rather than on the more familiar book values used for accounting
purposes.
Among the more interesting long-term trends highlighted in Ciccolo's
analysis is the finding that the widely recognized increase in debt in
manufacturing firms' capitalization has come primarily at the expense of
preferred stock. Relative to net assets, the market value of firms' debt
plus preferred stock has remained virtually constant. A second interest-
ing point is the contrast between the sharp fall in common equity values in
1929-32, which was entirely reversed by 1936, and the even sharper
post-1968 decline which was not reversed even by 1977 (or, for that
matter, 1981). Finally, although Ciccolo's work documented the long-
term declining trend in dividend payments and the postwar rising trend in
interest payments relative to firms' net assets, it showed that whether or
not there has been a downward trend in the rate of return on either
stockholders' equity or net assets depends largely on the beginning and
ending dates chosen for the analysis.
Ciccolo's paper, which appears as Chapter 4 of this volume, is an
introduction to a more comprehensive study which will be part of the
second stage of this overall research project.11 Introduction
Roger H. Gordon and David F. Bradford, in their paper "Taxation and
the Stock Market Valuation of Capital Gains and Dividends: Theory and
Empirical Results" (Journal of Public Economics, October 1980),
addressed the familiar puzzle of why U.S. corporations pay dividends.
Because dividends appear to be more heavily taxed than capital gains,
corporate shareholders ought to prefer either retained earnings or stock
repurchases to dividend payments, all other things being equal. In 1976,
however, corporations distributed in dividends $25 billion of a total $63
billion of profit net of taxes and interest. Either corporations are not
acting in the best interest of their shareholders, or shareholders desire
dividends sufficiently for other reasons to offset the tax effect.
Gordon and Bradford approached this question by developing and
estimating a model of the relative value of dividends and capital gains in
the U.S. equity market. For tax and other reasons, the taxpayer popula-
tion will exhibit a distribution of differing preferences between returns in
the form of dividends and returns in the form of capital gains. Individual
corporations' shares will differ in the division of their total return be-
tween the two forms, and investors making portfolio decisions will take
this division into account along with the corporation's risk structure. The
market equilibrium therefore determines a single rate of exchange be-
tween dividends and capital gains. Although this exchange rate cannot be
observed directly, it can be inferred from market data.
Gordon and Bradford's results indicated that the exchange rate be-
tween dividends and capital gains varies cyclically around an average
value of approximately unity. In other words, the relative values of
dividends and capital gains tend toward equality. These results are unsur-
prising from the perspective of corporations' choices of dividends versus
retentions, but they are inconsistent with the view that shareholders value
dividends and capital gains solely for their after-tax cash flow. Possible
explanations for this shareholder behavior include the potential role of
dividends as a signal of the corporation's future profitability, the exist-
ence of a frequently neglected class of shareholders for whom dividends
are less heavily taxed than capital gains, or even an irrational sheer
preference for dividends.
The cyclical variation in these results also has direct implications for
corporate financing and capital formation. In general, a cyclically high
value of dividends relative to capital gains will call forth not only a higher
retention rate but also a shift from debt to equity finance. To the extent
that the same measure also represents the value in the market of an
additional dollar of corporate investment, a cyclically high relative value
of dividends also indicates an incentive to increased physical investment.
Roger H. Gordon and Burton G. Malkiel, in their paper "Taxation and
Corporate Finance" (forthcoming as part of a Brookings Institution book
bearing the same title), addressed the distortions to U.S. corporate12 Benjamin M. Friedman
financing and investment decisions introduced by taxation when the
possibility of costly bankruptcy exists. Gordon and Malkiel used both
time series and cross-section data on variations in U.S. corporate debt-
equity ratios to examine the implications of a model of corporate financ-
ing and investment that explicitly allows for the possibility and costs of
bankruptcy. Using data from actual bankruptcy experiences, they also
estimated the magnitude of the efficiency costs associated with the distor-
tions due to the existing tax structure, as well as the efficiency implica-
tions of several possible modifications of that structure.
Gordon and Malkiel's results indicated that, as long as corporations
behave competitively, explicit allowance for bankruptcy costs is essential
to explaining the observed corporate financial structure. Otherwise the
theory leads to conclusions with clear counterfactual implications. The
historical experience in the United States since World War II involved
steadily increasing debt-equity ratios on balance until 1974. Their theory
explains this pattern in terms of increasing inflation and interest rates
together with increasing optimism about the future prospects of the
corporate sector until the early 1970s. The greater instability of the
economy during the mid-1970s apparently altered firms' assessments of
possible bankruptcy costs, however, and debt ratios were slightly reduced
after 1974.
Gordon and Malkiel's results also indicated that at least some of the
distortions associated with the existing tax structure are quantitatively
important. They estimated that the efficiency costs arising from tax
incentives to increase debt-equity ratios are on the order of $3 billion per
year, or about ten percent of corporate tax payments. By contrast, they
found that the efficiency costs of distortions in the allocation of capital
between the corporate and noncorporate sectors may be less important,
especially in comparison with previous estimates using earlier models. In
particular, their estimate of these costs is only one-fourth to one-third as
large as previous estimates. Primarily as a result of the larger efficiency
costs of distortions affecting debt-equity financing decisions, any of sev-
eral changes in the tax structure aimed at lessening financing distortions
in favor of debt would offer significant efficiency gains.
Martin Feldstein and Stephanie Seligman, in their paper "Pension
Funding, Share Price, and National Saving" {Journal of Finance, in
press), examined the effects of unfunded pension obligations on corpo-
rate share prices and explored the implications of these effects for na-
tional saving, the decline of the equity market in recent years, and the
rationality of corporate financial behavior. Their analysis was based on
information about inflation-adjusted income and assets for nearly two
hundred large U.S. manufacturing firms.
Feldstein and Seligman found that corporate share prices fully reflect
the conventional accounting measure of unfunded pension obligations.13 Introduction
The most important implication of this share price response is that the
existence of unfunded pension liabilities does not necessarily entail a
reduction in total private saving. Because the pension liability reduces the
equity value of the firm, shareholders are given notice of its existence and
hence an incentive to save more themselves. Unfunded private pensions
therefore differ fundamentally from unfunded government-sponsored
pensions like Social Security and civil service and military pensions.
Feldstein's paper "Private Pensions as Corporate Debt," which
appears as Chapter 5 of this volume, summarizes and extends this work.
Finally, in my own paper, "The Relative Stability of Money and Credit
'Velocities' in the United States: Evidence and Some Speculations"
(NBER Working Paper No. 645), I documented a long-standing stability
in the relationship between outstanding debt and economic activity in the
United States, and explored the implications for capital formation of
several hypotheses that could explain this observed phenomenon. In
particular, I showed that the aggregate of outstanding credit liabilities of
all nonfinancial borrowers in the United States bears as close a rela-
tionship to U.S. nonfinancial activity as do the more familiar asset aggre-
gates like the money stock (however measured) or the monetary base.
This stability in the debt-to-income relationship reflects the net outcome
of pronounced but offsetting movements of the public and private com-
ponents of the total debt aggregate.
I suggested three different hypotheses that provide potential explana-
tions for this phenomenon. Two of these hypotheses, one emphasizing
taxpayers' actions and one based on credit market borrowing constraints,
carry the implication that increases in government debt outstanding
associated with financing budget deficits crowd out private financing and
hence private capital formation. The third hypothesis, which emphasizes
the portfolio preferences of lenders, implies that increased government
financing will not crowd out private capital formation but will cause the
private sector to shift from debt to equity financing.
My paper "Debt and Economic Activity in the United States," which
appears as Chapter 6 of this volume, summarizes and extends this work.